type in yourself? Whether this be so or not, what seems infinitely more important is—\(why \textit{revert to myth}^{51}\)

If myth is given up, a little joy, a little discovery, is restored to psychoanalysis. For it has become very dismal, very sad, quite interminable, with everything decided in advance. Will it be retorted that the schizo is not joyous either? But doesn't his sadness come from the fact that he can no longer bear the forces of oedipalization and hamletization that hem him in on all sides? Better to flee to the body without organs and hide out there, closing himself up in it. The little joy lies in schizophrenization as a process, not in the schizo as a clinical entity. "You have pushed a process into a goal..." If we made a psychoanalyst enter into the domains of the productive unconscious, he would feel as out of place with his theater as an actress from the Comedie-Francaise in a factory, a priest from the Middle Ages on an assembly line. We must set up units of production, plug in desiring-machines. What takes place in this factory, what this process is, its spasms and its glories, its labors and its joys, still remain unknown.

**Social Repression and Psychic Repression**

We have attempted to analyze the form, the reproduction, the (formal) cause, the method, and the condition of the Oedipal triangle. But we have postponed the analysis of the real forces, the real causes on which the triangulation depends. The general line of the response is simple, it has been sketched out by Reich: it is social repression, the forces of social repression. This response, however, leaves two problems untouched and makes them even more urgent: on the one hand, the specific relationship between psychic repression and social repression; on the other hand, the particular situation of Oedipus in this social repression-psychic repression system. The two problems are obviously linked because, if psychic repression did bear on incestuous desires, it would thereby gain a certain independence and primacy, as a condition for constituting a system of exchange or any society, in relation to social repression, which would then concern only the returns of the psychically repressed in a constituted society. Therefore we should first of all consider the second question: does psychic repression bear upon the Oedipus complex as an adequate expression of the unconscious? Must we even follow Freud in saying that the Oedipus complex, according to one or the other of its two poles, is either repressed (not without leaving behind traces and returns that will be confronted by the prohibitions), or suppressed (not without being passed on to the children, with whom the same story begins all over again)?

**PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FAMILIALISM: THE HOLY FAMILY**
We wonder if Oedipus in fact expresses desire; if Oedipus is desired, then it is indeed on it that psychic repression comes to bear. Now the Freudian argument is of a nature to leave us wondering: Freud quotes a remark by Sir J. G. Frazer according to which "the law only forbids men to do what their instincts incline them to do; . . . Instead of assuming, therefore, from the legal prohibition of incest that there is a natural aversion to incest, we ought rather to assume that there is a natural instinct in favor of it." In other words: if it is prohibited, this is because it is desired—there would be no need to prohibit what is not desired. Once again, it is this confidence in the law, the unawareness of the ruses and the procedures of the law, that leaves us wondering.

The immortal father of Celine's *Death on the Installment Plan* (Mort a credit) cries out: So you want to see me die, eh, is that what you want, speak up? We didn't want anything of the sort, however. We didn't want the train to be daddy, or the station mommy. We only wanted peace and innocence, and to be left alone to machine our little machines, O desiring-production. Of course pieces from the bodies of the mother and the father are taken up in the connections, parental appellations crop up in the disjunctions of the chain, the parents are there as ordinary stimuli of an indifferent nature that trigger the becoming of adventures, of races, and of continents. But what a bizarre Freudian mania—to relate to Oedipus what overflows it on every side and from all angles, beginning with the hallucination of books and the delirium of apprenticeships (the teacher as father-substitute, and the book as family romance). Freud couldn't abide a simple humorous remark by Jung, to the effect that Oedipus must not really exist, since even the primitive prefers a pretty young woman to his mother or his grandmother. If Jung betrayed everything, it was nevertheless not by way of this remark, which can only suggest that the mother functions as a pretty girl as much as the pretty girl functions as mother, since the main thing for the primitive or the child is to form and put into motion their desiring-machines, to make flows circulate and to perform breaks in these flows.

The law tells us: You will not marry your mother, and you will not kill your father. And we docile subjects say to ourselves: so that's what I wanted! Will it ever be suspected that the law discredits—and has an interest in discrediting and disgracing—the person it presumes to be guilty, the person the law wants to be guilty and wants to be made to feel guilty? One acts as if it were possible to conclude directly from psychic repression the nature of the repressed, and from the prohibition the nature of what is prohibited. There we have a typical paralogism—yet another, a fourth paralogism that we shall have to call displacement. For what really takes place is that the law prohibits something that is.
perfectly fictitious in the order of desire or of the "instincts," so as to persuade its subjects that they had the intention corresponding to this fiction. This is indeed the only way the law has of getting a grip on intention, of making the unconscious guilty. In short, we are not witness here to a system of two terms where we could conclude from the formal prohibition what is really prohibited. Instead we have before us a system of three terms, where this conclusion becomes completely illegitimate. Distinctions must be made: the repressing representation which performs the repression; the repressed representative, on which the repression actually comes to bear; the displaced represented, which gives a falsified apparent image that is meant to trap desire.

Such is the nature of Oedipus—the sham image. Repression does not operate through Oedipus, nor is it directed at Oedipus. It is not a question of the return of the repressed. Oedipus is a factitious product of psychic repression. It is only the represented, insofar as it is induced by repression. Repression cannot act without displacing desire, without giving rise to a consequent desire, all ready, all warm for punishment, and without putting this desire in the place of the antecedent desire on which repression comes to bear in principle or in reality ("Ah, so that's what it was!").

D. H. Lawrence—who does not struggle against Freud in the name of the rights of the Ideal, but who speaks by virtue of the flows of sexuality and the intensities of the unconscious, and who is incensed and bewildered by what Freud is doing when he closets sexuality in the Oedipal nursery—has a foreboding of this operation of displacement, and protests with all his might: no, Oedipus is not a state of desire and the drives, it is an idea, nothing but an idea that repression inspires in us concerning desire; not even a compromise, but an idea in the service of repression, its propaganda, or its propagation. "The incest motive is a logical deduction of the human reason, which has recourse to this last extremity, to save itself . . . which first and foremost is a logical deduction made by the human reason, even if unconsciously made, and secondly is introduced into the affective passional sphere, where it now proceeds to serve as a principle for action. . . . This has nothing to do with the active unconscious [which] sparkles, vibrates, travels . . . we realize that the unconscious contains nothing ideal, nothing in the least conceptual, and hence nothing in the least personal, since personality, like the ego, belongs to the conscious or mental-subjective self. So the first analyses are, or should be, so impersonal that the so-called human relations are not involved. The first relationship is neither personal nor biological—a fact which psychoanalysis has not succeeded in grasping."54

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FAMILIAUSM: THE HOLY FAMILY 119
Oedipal desires are not at all repressed, nor do they have any reason to be. They are nevertheless in an intimate relationship with psychic repression, but in a different manner. Oedipal desires are the bait, the disfigured image by means of which repression catches desire in the trap. If desire is repressed, this is not because it is desire for the mother and for the death of the father; on the contrary, desire becomes that only because it is repressed, it takes on that mask only under the reign of the repression that models the mask for it and plasters it on its face. Besides, it is doubtful that incest was a real obstacle to the establishment of society, as the partisans of an *exchangist* conception claim. We have seen that there were other obstacles. The real danger is elsewhere. If desire is repressed, it is because every position of desire, no matter how small, is capable of calling into question the established order of a society: not that desire is asocial, on the contrary. But it is explosive; there is no desiring-machine capable of being assembled without demolishing entire social sectors. Despite what some revolutionaries think about this, desire is revolutionary in its essence—desire, not left-wing holidays!—and no society can tolerate a position of real desire without its structures of exploitation, servitude, and hierarchy being compromised.

If a society is identical with its structures—an amusing hypothesis—then yes, desire threatens its very being. It is therefore of vital importance for a society to repress desire, and even to find something more efficient than repression, so that repression, hierarchy, exploitation, and servitude are themselves desired. It is quite troublesome to have to say such rudimentary things: desire does not threaten a society because it is a desire to sleep with the mother, but because it is revolutionary. And that does not at all mean that desire is something other than sexuality, but that sexuality and love do not live in the bedroom of Oedipus, they dream instead of wide-open spaces, and cause strange flows to circulate that do not let themselves be stocked within an established order. Desire does not “want” revolution, it is revolutionary in its own right, as though involuntarily, by wanting what it wants. From the beginning of this study we have maintained both that social production and desiring-production are one and the same, and that they have differing regimes, with the result that a social form of production exercises an essential repression of desiring-production, and also that desiring-production—a "real" desire—is potentially capable of demolishing the social form. But what is a "real" desire, since repression is also desired? How can we tell them apart? We demand the right to a very deliberate analysis. For even in their contrary uses, let us make no mistake about it, the same syntheses are at issue.
It is clear what psychoanalysis expects to gain from claiming a link, where Oedipus would be the object of repression, and even its subject through the intermediary of the superego. From this it expects a cultural justification for psychic repression—a justification that makes psychic repression move into the foreground and no longer considers the problem of social repression as anything more than secondary from the point of view of the unconscious. That is why critics have been able to observe a conservative or reactionary turning point in Freud, from the moment that he gave an autonomous value to psychic repression as a condition of culture acting against the incestuous drives: Reich goes so far as to say that the crucial turning point of Freudianism, *the abandonment of sexuality*, comes when Freud accepts the idea of a primary anxiety that supposedly touches off psychic repression in an endogenous fashion. Consider the 1908 article on "civilized sexual morality": Oedipus is not yet named here; psychic repression is considered in terms of social repression, which gives rise to a displacement and acts on the partial drives insofar as they represent in their own fashion a sort of desiring-production, before being exercised against the incestuous or other drives threatening legitimate marriage. But it then becomes evident that, the more the problem of Oedipus and incest comes to occupy center stage, the more psychic repression and its correlates, suppression and sublimation, will be founded on supposedly transcendent requirements of civilization, at the same time that the psychoanalyst plunges deeper into a familialist and ideological vision.

We do not need to relate again the reactionary compromises of Freudianism, and even its "theoretical surrender": this work has been accomplished several times, in a profound way, rigorously, and with nuances.\textsuperscript{55} We see no special problem in the possibility of a coexistence of revolutionary, reformist, and reactionary elements at the heart of the same theoretical and practical doctrine. We refuse to play "take it or leave it," under the pretext that theory justifies practice, being born from it, or that one cannot challenge the process of "cure" except by starting from elements drawn from this very cure. As if every great doctrine were not a *combined formation*, constructed from bits and pieces, various intermingled codes and flux, partial elements and derivatives, that constitute its very life or its becoming. As if we could reproach someone for having an ambiguous relationship with psychoanalysis, without first mentioning that psychoanalysis owes its existence to a relationship, theoretically and practically ambiguous, with what it discovers and the forces that it wields.

While the critical study of Freudian ideology has been done, and done well, on the other hand the history of the movement has never even
been sketched out: the structure of the psychoanalytic group, its politics, its tendencies and its focal points, its self-applications, its suicides and its follies, the enormous group superego—everything that took place on the body of the master. What has come to be called the monumental work of Ernest Jones does not penetrate censorship, it codifies it. And the way the three elements coexisted: the exploratory, pioneering, revolutionary element, whereby desiring-production was discovered; the classical cultural element, which reduces everything to a scene from Oedipal theatrical representation (the return to myth!); and finally the third element, the most disturbing, a sort of racket thirsting after respectability, which will never have done with getting itself recognized and institutionalized—a formidable enterprise of absorption of surplus value, with its codification of the interminable cure, its cynical justification of the role of money, and all the pledges it makes to the established order. All these elements were present in Freud, a fantastic Christopher Columbus, a brilliant bourgeois reader of Goethe, Shakespeare, and Sophocles, a masked Al Capone.

The strength of Reich consists in having shown how psychic repression depended on social repression. Which in no way implies a confusion of the two concepts, since social repression needs psychic repression precisely in order to form docile subjects and to ensure the reproduction of the social formation, including its repressive structures. But social repression should not be understood by using as a starting point a familial repression coextensive with civilization—far from it; it is civilization that must be understood in terms of a social repression inherent to a given form of social production. Social repression bears on desire—and not solely on needs or interests—only by means of sexual repression. The family is indeed the delegated agent of this psychic repression, insofar as it ensures "a mass psychological reproduction of the economic system of a society." Of course it should not be concluded from this that desire is Oedipal. On the contrary, it is the social repression of desire or sexual repression—that is, the stasis of libidinal energy—that actualizes Oedipus and engages desire in this requisite impasse, organized by the repressive society.

Reich was the first to raise the problem of the relationship between desire and the social field (and went further than Marcuse, who treats the problem lightly). He is the true founder of a materialist psychiatry. Situating the problem in terms of desire, he is the first to reject the explanations of a summary Marxism too quick to say the masses were fooled, mystified. But since he had not sufficiently formulated the concept of desiring-production, he did not succeed in determining the insertion of desire into the economic infrastructure itself, the insertion
of the drives into social production. Consequently, revolutionary investment seemed to him such that the desire moving within it simply coincided with an economic rationality; as to the reactionary mass investments, they seemed to him to derive from ideology, so that psychoanalysis merely had the role of explaining the subjective, the negative, and the inhibited, without participating directly as psychoanalysis in the positivity of the revolutionary movement or in the desiring-creativity. (To a certain extent, didn't this amount to a reintroduction of the error or the illusion?) The fact remains that Reich, in the name of desire, caused a song of life to pass into psychoanalysis. He denounced, in the final resignation of Freudianism, a fear of life, a resurgence of the ascetic ideal, a cultural broth of bad consciousness. Better to depart in search of the Orgone, he said to himself, in search of the vital and cosmic element of desire, than to continue being a psychoanalyst under those conditions. No one forgave him this, whereas Freud got full pardon. Reich was the first to attempt to make the analytic machine and the revolutionary machine function together. In the end, he only had his own desiring-machines, his paranoiac, miraculous, and celibate boxes, with metallic inner walls lined with cotton and wool.

Psychic repression distinguishes itself from social repression by the unconscious nature of the operation and by its result ("even the inhibition of revolt has become unconscious"), a distinction that expresses clearly the difference in nature between the two repressions. But a real independence cannot be concluded from this. Psychic repression is such that social repression becomes desired; it induces a consequent desire, a faked image of its object, on which it bestows the appearance of independence. Strictly speaking, psychic repression is a means in the service of social repression. What it bears on is also the object of social repression: desiring-production. But it in fact implies an original double operation: the repressive social formation delegates its power to an agent of psychic repression, and correlatively the repressed desire is as though masked by the faked displaced image to which the repression gives rise. Psychic repression is delegated by the social formation, while the desiring-formation is disfigured, displaced by psychic repression.

The family is the delegated agent of psychic repression, or rather the agent delegated to psychic repression; the incestuous drives are the disfigured image of the repressed. The Oedipus complex, the process of oedipalization, is therefore the result of this double operation. It is in one and the same movement that the repressive social production is replaced by the repressing family, and that the latter offers a displaced image of desiring-production that represents the repressed as incestuous familial drives. In this way the family/drives relationship is substituted for the
relationship between the two orders of production, in a diversion where the whole of psychoanalysis goes astray. And the interest of such an operation, from the point of view of social production, becomes evident, for the latter could not otherwise ward off desire's potential for revolt and revolution. By placing the distorting mirror of incest before desire (that's what you wanted, isn't it?), desire is shamed, stupefied, it is placed in a situation without exit, it is easily persuaded to deny "itself" in the name of the more important interests of civilization (what if everyone did the same, what if everyone married his mother or kept his sister for himself? there would no longer be any differentiation, any exchanges possible). We must act quickly and soon. Incest, a slandered shallow stream.

Although we can see social production's interest in such an operation, it is less clear what makes this operation possible from the point of view of desiring-production itself. We do have, however, the elements of a response. Social production would need at its disposal, on the recording surface of the socius, an agent that is also capable of acting on, of inscribing the recording surface of desire. Such an agent exists: the family. It belongs essentially to the recording of social production, as a system of reproduction of the producers. And doubtless, at the other pole, the recording of desiring-production on the body without organs is brought about through a genealogical network that is not familial: parents only intervene here as partial objects, flows, signs, and agents of a process that outflanks them on all sides. At most, the child innocently "relates" to his parents some part of the astonishing productive experience he is undergoing with his desire; but this experience is not related to them as such. Yet this is precisely where the operation arises. Under the precocious action of social repression, the family slips into and interferes with the network of desiring-genealogy; it assumes the task of alienating the entire genealogy; it confiscates the Numen (but see here, God is daddy). The desiring-experience is treated as if it were intrinsically related to the parents, and as if the family were its supreme law. Partial objects are subjected to the notorious law of totality-unity acting as "lacking." The disjunctions are subjected to the alternative of the undifferentiated or exclusion.

The family is therefore introduced into the production of desire and will perform a displacement, an unparalleled repression of desire commencing with the earliest age of the child. Social production delegates the family to psychic repression. And if the family is able in this manner to slip into the recording of desire, it is because the body without organs on which this recording is accomplished already exercises on its own account, as we have seen, a primal repression of
desiring-production. It falls to the family to profit from this, and to superimpose the repression that is properly termed secondary, this being a function delegated to the family or one to which the family is delegated. (Psychoanalysis has clearly demonstrated the difference between these two repressions, but has not shown the scope of this difference or the distinction between their respective regimes.) That is why psychic repression in the strict sense does not content itself with repressing real desiring-production, but offers a displaced apparent image of the repressed, by substituting a familial recording for the recording of desire. Desiring-production taken as a whole does not assume the well-known Oedipal figure except in the familial translation of its recording. Translation-betrayal.

At times we say that Oedipus is nothing, almost nothing (within the order of desiring-production, even in the child); at other times we say that it is everywhere (in the enterprise of domesticating the unconscious, of representing desire and the unconscious). To be sure, we have never dreamed of saying that psychoanalysis invented Oedipus. Everything points in the opposite direction: the subjects of psychoanalysis arrive already oedipalized, they demand it, they want more. News flash: Stravinsky declares before dying: “My misfortune, I am sure of it, came from my father's being so distant with me and from the small amount of affection shown me by my mother. So I decided that one day I would show them.” If even artists give in to this, it would be a mistake to stand on ceremony and hold to the ordinary scruples of a diligent psychoanalyst. If a musician tells us that music does not attest to active and conquering forces, but to reactive forces, to reactions to daddy-mommy, we have only to play again on a paradox dear to Nietzsche, while barely modifying it: Freud-as-musician.

No, psychoanalysts invent nothing, though they have invented much in another way, and have legislated a lot, reinforced a lot, injected a lot. All that psychoanalysts do is to reinforce the movement; they add a last burst of energy to the displacement of the entire unconscious. What they do is merely to make the unconscious speak according to the transcendent uses of synthesis imposed on it by other forces: Global Persons, the Complete Object, the Great Phallus, the Terrible Undifferentiated of the Imaginary, Symbolic Differentials, Segregation. What psychoanalysts invent is only the transference, a transference Oedipus, a consulting-room Oedipus of Oedipus, especially noxious and virulent, but where the subject finally has what he wants, and sucks away at his Oedipus on the full body of the analyst. And that's already too much. But Oedipus takes shape in the family, not in the analyst's office, which merely acts as the last territoriality. And Oedipus is not made by the
family. The Oedipal uses of synthesis, oedipalization, triangulation castration, all refer to forces a bit more powerful, a bit more subterranean than psychoanalysis, than the family, than ideology, even joined together. There we have all the forces of social production, reproduction, and repression. This can be explained by the simple truth that very powerful forces are required to defeat the forces of desire, lead them to resignation, and substitute everywhere reactions of the daddy-mommy type for what is essentially active, aggressive, artistic, productive, and triumphant in the unconscious itself. It is in this sense, as we have seen, that Oedipus is an application, and the family a delegated agent. Even by application it is hard, it is difficult for a child to live and experience himself as an angle,

*Cet enfant
il n'est pas là,
il n'est qu'un angle,
un angle à venir;
et il n'y a pas d'angle....
or ce monde du père-mère est justement ce qui doit s'en aller,
c'est ce monde dédouble-double,
en état de désunion constante,
en volonté d'unification constante aussi....
autour duquel tourne tout le système de ce monde
malignement soutenu par la plus sombre organisation.*

8 Neurosis and Psychosis

In 1924 Freud proposed a simple criterion for distinguishing between neurosis and psychosis: in neurosis the ego obeys the requirements of reality and stands ready to repress the drives of the id, whereas in psychosis the ego is under the sway of the id, ready to break with reality. Freud's ideas often took quite some time before making their way into France. Not this one, however; that same year Capgras and Carrette presented a case of schizophrenia with a delusion of doubles, where the patient manifested a strong hatred for her mother and an incestuous desire for her father, but under conditions of reality loss where the parents were lived as false parents or "doubles." From this they drew the illustration of the inverse relationship: in neurosis the object function of reality is preserved, but on condition that the causal

*Antonin Artaud, “Ainsi donc la question...” in *Tel Quel*, No. 30 (1967). “This child/he is not there/he is but an angle/an angle to come, and there is no angle.... and yet it is precisely this world of father-mother which must go away, it is this world, split in two doubled in a state of constant disunion, also willing a constant unification.... around which turns the entire system of this world/maliciously sustained by the most sombre organization.”